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Varieties of Economic Crisis, Varieties of Ideational 
Change: How and Why financial regulation and 
macroeconomic policy differ 
(Conditional acceptance, New Political Economy). 
Partly because of the historical experience of the great depression of the 1930s and the 
stagflation of the 1970s, much political economy scholarship associates episodes of financial 
and economic crises with far reaching ideational change (Blyth, 2002, Helleiner, 2010, Hall, 
1993, Hay, 1996, 2011, Gamble, 2009). One important contribution draws attention to a 
process of ‘persuasive struggle’ between elites and mass publics that crises ignite, as agents 
compete for the right to define the nature of that crisis and how to respond by forwarding 
interpretations and arguments drawn from particular intellectual frames (Widamier, Blyth and 
Seabrooke, 2007, Blyth, 2002). What has been missing from the existing literature on 
ideational change at times of crises however, is a sense of how these processes of persuasive 
struggle, and how the success of those ‘norm entrepreneurs’ arguing for ideational change is 
shaped by two contextual variables: the most immediate material symptoms and problems 
that a crisis displays (the variety of crisis); and the institutional character of the policy 
subsystem that agents have to operate within to affect change. Introducing these two variables 
into our accounts of persuasive struggle and ideational change enables us to deepen our 
understanding of the dynamics of ideational change at times of crisis. This is important and 
relevant for our understanding of the political economy of the recent financial crash, because 
a quite rapid and radical intellectual change has been evident in the field of financial 
regulation in the form of an embrace of a macroprudential frame (Borio, 2009, 2011, Baker 
2013a, 2013b, Goodhart, 2014). In contrast in the field of macroeconomic policy - both 
monetary and fiscal policy, many pre-crash beliefs remain prominent, there is evidence of 
ideational stickiness and inertia, and despite some policy experimentation, overarching policy 
frameworks and their rationales have not as yet been overhauled (Farrell and Quiggin, 2012, 
Blyth, 2013a, 2013b Dellepiane‐Avellaneda, 2014, Hodson and Mabbett, 2010, Clift, 2014).  
In this respect, why some ideas change at times of crisis and in some policy areas but not in 
others, and why some ideas are successful in taking root in certain circumstances and not in 
others, are questions that require more attention in the field of political economy (Chwieroth, 
2010). This article addresses these questions by focusing on the context in which actors or 
‘norm entrepreneurs’ arguing for change operate, and how that context effects their strategies 
and success. Norm entrepreneurs are individuals, usually with expert technical knowledge, 
who construct cognitive frameworks to give meaning to events such as economic crisis, and 
generally promote these frameworks and ideas out of a sense of  genuine ‘ideational 
commitment,’ because they genuinely believe in a set of ideas, even if they have no 
immediate material impact on their own well-being (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p.897-
898), although this should not rule out the possibility that individuals can act in a more 
instrumental fashion and promote ideas that favour the institutions they represent.  
           The article applies Peter Hall’s framework of three orders of policy changes to help 
illuminate and explain the variation in patterns of change in the fields of financial regulation 
and macroeconomic policy since the financial crash of 2008 (Hall, 1993). First, applying 
Hall’s framework of three orders of change helps us to identify that radical intellectual 
change in financial regulation appears to proceed much more quickly than radical 
macroeconomic intellectual change. Second, it illustrates how the sequencing of ideational 
change is different in financial regulation than in macroeconomic policy. Third, it illuminates 
that experts and technocrats have more scope to affect radical intellectual change in financial 
regulation, but are more constrained in terms of detail and practical policy implementation, 
whereas the evidence points in the opposite direction in macroeconomic policy, with 
technocrats having more autonomy over the detail of policy, but less in setting broader 
intellectual frames. Ultimately, it is argued that both policy areas respond to different 
varieties of crises in different ways because of their contrasting political and institutional 
characteristics, with financial regulation likely to respond to dramatic, explosive banking 
crises, because it is easier for norm entrepreneurs to make a plausible case for regulatory 
change in such circumstances that will have intuitive appeal to a range of actors. 
Macroeconomic policy is more likely to respond to slow burning crises of progressive 
macroeconomic underperformance, making profound intellectual change in macroeconomic 
policy a much slower long term process, as time is required for the case for change to be 
assembled and for it to become appealing to the plurality of actors required to make it 
politically viable. Ideational change is therefore not only mediated and shaped by institutional 
context (Bell, 2011), but norm entrepreneurs’ capacity to promote ideational change is 
constrained by the material symptoms of crisis, which will shape the intuitive appeal of their 
arguments to a range of other actors (Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007). 
         While the argument developed here does draw attention to different varieties of 
economic crisis and their symptoms, unlike accounts of varieties of economic crisis in the 
economics literature (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008,) we cannot afford to focus solely on the 
material economic manifestations and features of crisis alone. Rather a genuine political 
economy of crises has to examine the interactions between the material financial and 
economic symptoms of crisis and how the process of political and intellectual construction of 
crisis proceeds through persuasive struggles and the assembling of viable political coalitions, 
as undertaken by norm entrepreneurs. I first raise the prospect that contemporary financial 
regulation and macroeconomic policy are characterised by different ideational patterns since 
the financial crash of 2008. I then seek to explain this by contrasting the dynamics of 
exceptional macroeconomic change in the 1970s in Britain, with exceptional financial 
regulatory change since the 2008 crash. Finally, I ask what the implications of this analysis 
might be for the patterns of institutional and ideational politics surrounding macroeconomic 
policy in the current period. 
 
 
Financial Regulation and Macroeconomic Policy on Divergent Policy Tracks? 
One of the most intriguing and potentially illuminating statements made by a policy maker in 
the post 2008 crash era, was made by the Bank of England’s former Deputy Governor, Paul 
Tucker. In a 2011 speech, Tucker stated:  
“we needed to think about markets somewhat differently when we are doing 
monetary policy and financial stability. For monetary policy in most 
circumstances, it is a reasonable default assumption that core markets are more or 
less efficient most of the time. So while we absolutely have to be alert to 
distortions, we are not crazy to infer from yield curves, expectations about the 
path of policy rates or of inflation. But for financial stability (regulation), which 
of course affects macroeconomic conditions, I have always encouraged the team 
to do a ‘Gesltalt flip’ to think of markets as inefficient, riddled with preferred 
habitats, imperfect information, regulatory arbitrage, herding and inhabited by 
agents with less than idealised rationality” (Tucker, 2011, pp.3-4).  
This statement is interesting and potentially illuminating because it indicates that central 
banks are characterised by a degree of intellectual pragmatism and that the ideational and 
institutional politics in the area of macroeconomic policy and financial regulation might be 
quite different.  
       It is now widely accepted in regulatory circles that over reliance on banks’ Value at Risk 
(VaR) models that revolved around market prices and the subsequent monitoring of those 
models by supervisors, was one of the weaknesses of the pre-crash regulatory regime 
(Turner, 2011, Persaud, 2009, Brunnermeir at al 2009, FSA, 2009, FSF, 2009, Panetta et al, 
2009, Youngman, 2009, Goodhart, 2005, Borio, Furfine and Low, 2001). Market prices were 
assumed to be driven by the rational interaction of multiple independent agents and market 
risk was therefore mathematically modelable. These beliefs informed regulatory practice, as 
greater transparency, more disclosure and more effective risk management by financial firms 
based on market prices became the cornerstones for the regulation of supposedly efficient 
markets (Eatwell, 2009, Turner, 2011). All of this was largely justified by the arguments of 
new classical economists such as Robert Lucas, that if human beings are rational in their 
preferences, choices and expectations then the macroeconomy would have a strong tendency 
towards equilibrium (Lucas, 1980), as well as Eugene Fama’s efficient markets hypothesis 
that liquid financial markets were characterized by the efficient processing of all available 
information, making the actual price of a security a good estimation of its intrinsic value 
(Fama, 1970). In the words of the chair of the UK’s Financial Services Authority, Lord Adair 
Turner, in the pre-crash period, a simplified version of the efficient markets hypothesis 
became part of the regulatory ‘institutional DNA’ (Turner, 2011,) The financial collapse of 
2007-8, as  Tucker himself concedes, revealed that ‘securities were fundamentally mispriced 
(Tucker, 2011, p.3)’ and that markets and the agents that constitute them do make ex ante 
mistakes ( p.2), questioning the claims of the ‘rational expectations paradigm’ that has 
dominated economics since the 1970s (Tucker, 2011, p.2). Armed with efficient markets 
assumptions, supervisors, in the pre-crash period, focused on assessing and evaluating the 
risk management models and procedures of individual banks (Tsingou, 2008). Since the crash 
and in recognition that financial markets are prone to procyclicality, that herding is common 
behaviour, and that financial complexity and innovation can engender inherent financial 
instability, regulators throughout the world are now seeking to build macroprudential 
regulatory regimes based on macro level countercyclical interventions intended to limit 
systemic risk and endogenous financial instability, in a significant and intellectually radical 
macroprudential ideational shift (Baker, 2013a, 2013b, Baker and Widmaier, 2014).  
        There is a curious tension in Tucker’s statement about the different assumptions 
underpinning regulatory policy and monetary policy. The discrepancy between the two policy 
areas is not just a case of simply altering a variable in a model. Rather it is the fundamental 
assumption about how the financial world is actually constituted and functions, and about the 
behaviour of economic agents and of the implications of this for wider economic and market 
systems. If the Bank’s assumption about financial markets generally being myopic, prone to 
instability and characterised by herding is the correct one, why is it reasonable to use an 
opposite and diametrically opposed assumption as the basis for monetary policy, when in the 
admission of key Bank personnel it is an inaccurate representation of how financially markets 
actually function?  Moreover, this situation is not just specific to the Bank of England. For 
officials at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), who pushed the movement towards 
macroprudential regulatory philosophies, since the crisis, ‘macroeconomic policy has one 
language, while financial stability policy now has a different language, and this situation is 
not ‘tenable’ (Confidential interview conducted with BIS official, Basel, 07 February 2014.) While 
central banks have been willing to change ‘their beliefs about the self equilibrating properties 
of markets’ in relation to regulatory and financial stability policy, they have been reluctant to 
do likewise in relation to monetary policy (Confidential correspondence with BIS official, 12 
February 2012)
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      If we revisit the justification for the current monetary policy framework in the UK, 
introduced in 1997 by the New Labour government, to give operational independence to the 
Bank of England to set interest rates to meet a pre defined inflation target, it revolved around 
the need to achieve credibility through ‘pre commitment,’ maximum transparency and 
constrained discretion by facing down ‘time inconsistency’ (Balls, 1998). In other words, the 
framework was justified by the need to signal ‘good future intentions’ to rational economic 
agents. Moreover, reaching judgements on what may happen to inflation requires a degree of 
formal modelling and forecasting that requires an assumption that agents will respond 
rationally to future price signals. In this sense, the assumption in monetary policy has served 
the Bank of England and other central banks rather well. However, when we contrast this 
with the position the Bank adopts in financial regulation, it would also appear to be a 
convenient and pragmatic fiction. In this sense, the first assumption outlined by Tucker, 
provided the justification for expanding the Bank’s powers to set interest rates and to target a 
pre assigned measure of inflation. It is therefore easy to see why the Bank continues to be 
wedded to such assumptions in the field of monetary policy, because it is central to its pivotal 
role in monetary policy making. For example, only in the first half of 2014 has Governor of 
the Bank of England, Mark Carney begun to openly question the UK’s inflation targeting 
regime as a potential distraction, some five and half years on from the peak of the financial 
distress that shook the prior efficient markets orthodoxy, suggesting there has been resistance 
to learning in the field of monetary policy and that this process has proceeded very slowly 
(Carney, 2014). Moreover, Bank personnel have invested considerable time, energy and their 
professional futures in models, data and forecasting designed to make the existing monetary 
policy framework function. In financial regulation, exactly the opposite applies. The Bank 
was stripped of its regulatory responsibilities by the 1997 legislation, but is now seeing an 
expansion in its regulatory role. The assumption that markets are prone to irrationality, 
myopia and herding, provides a justification for more intrusive forms of regulation that focus 
more directly on the business models and practises of private institutions, allowing the Bank 
to be much more assertive in relation to the financial industry. The Bank is a direct 
beneficiary of this change in assumptions, as the new Financial Policy Committee (FPC) has 
been given power to alter and raise counter cyclical capital requirements, sectoral capital 
requirements and to make recommendations regarding new regulatory rules (Tucker, 2011, p. 
4). Therefore while central banks have had institutional incentives to challenge efficient 
market thinking in the field of financial regulatory policy, they also have institutional 
incentives to favour inertia in the field of monetary policy. While this is a clear and attractive 
explanation for the different patterns of post-crash ideational change in macroeconomic and 
financial regulatory policy, it is also a partial and simplistic one, because central banks do not 
determine policy outcomes in either field in isolation and have little input into fiscal policy, 
which also appears to have displayed some intellectual continuity being guided by notions of 
crowding out, Ricardian equivalence and the expansionary potential of fiscal contraction 
(Blyth, 2013). 
 
The UK’s Macroeconomic Paradigm Shift in the 1970s 
Peter Hall’s work on British macroeconomic policy highlighted a number of features that 
potentially tell us a great deal about the institutional and policy dynamics of macroeconomic 
policy change (Hall, 1993). Hall distinguished between three orders of policy change: the 
ideas and assumptions that inform and set the overarching objectives of policy in a given area 
(third order change): the institutional arrangements and instruments used to achieve those 
objectives (second order change): and the precise settings of those instruments in quantitative 
or numerical terms (first order change) (Hall, 1993). Hall used the notion of third order 
change to denote radical change in the overarching terms of policy discourse, in the hierarchy 
of goals behind policy (Hall, 1993, p.279) and in causal assumptions or accounts of how the 
world facing policy makers actually works (Hall, 1993, p.280). He associated this kind of 
change with a Kuhnian ‘paradigm shift’ (Kuhn, 1996). Thomas Kuhn of course, famously 
compared scientific paradigms to a Gestalt or an interpretative framework of terminology and 
assumptions, which are influential precisely because so much of them are taken for granted 
and resistant to scrutiny.  From time to time, the policy and regulatory process Hall argued, is 
characterized by a shift from one policy frame to another, - third order change. Kuhn referred 
to this process of moving from one paradigm to another as a ‘Gestalt flip’, when underlying 
assumptions about aspects of the world are overturned and replaced with a different, or 
diametrically opposed set of assumptions about how things are actually constituted, as in Paul 
Tucker’s use of the term to distinguish the differing assumptions the Bank of England adopts 
in monetary policy and financial regulation.  
         Hall developed the idea of third order change based on an examination of the shift from 
Keynesian to Monetarist macroeconomic policy making in Britain during the 1970s. While 
macroeconomic policy in Britain was occasionally at least partially pragmatically Keynesian 
in outlook since 1979, (Clift and Tomlinson, 2007, Oliver and Pemberton, 2004), as Oliver 
and Pemberton note, this overlooks that there was a basic trajectory change in British 
macroeconomic policy and UK political economy more generally, that was driven in part by 
a change in dominant economic ideas, heralding three decades of market oriented 
neoliberalism (Oliver and Pemberton, 2004). For former British Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Nigel Lawson, under the Keynesian frame the objective of macroeconomic policy was to 
generate growth through stimulus and fiscal expansion, while the objective of microeconomic 
policy was to contain inflation through incomes policy. Under the Thatcher governments 
these roles were reversed. Microeconomic policy was used to generate growth through 
structural reform, privatisation, labour and financial market deregulation and the removal of 
red tape, allowing business and entrepreneurs as ‘supply side heroes,’ to expand and become 
more profitable, in accordance with Say’s Law that supply generates its own demand. In 
contrast after 1979 macroeconomic policy concentrated on stabilising inflation, rather than on 
growth and reducing unemployment (Lawson, 1992).  
      In Hall’s analysis the shift from Keynesian policy in Britain was characterised by three 
very specific features. These are time or duration, sequencing and political and institutional 
context. These variables are laid out in table 1.  
 Time: A slow burning crisis of stagnation 
First, relating to time or temporal dynamics the shift was a protracted process played out over 
six years from 1973 to 1979. The Keynesian paradigm according to Hall was characterised by 
the progressive accumulation of anomalies from 1973 onwards (Hall, 1993). This was most 
notable in the occurrence of stagflation, - a simultaneous increase in inflation and 
unemployment, - a phenomenon that was not fully comprehensible within the terms of the 
existing paradigm, and in Hall’s terms, appeared to ‘vitiate the Phillips curve’ (Hall, 1993, 
p.285). However, wholesale third order change and the formal abandonment of Keynesian 
objectives, only transpired some six years later following the election of Margaret Thatcher in 
1979 (Hall, 1993, p.283.) In other words, the crisis of the 1970s was very much a slow 
burning long term economic crisis of stagnation, persistent lack of growth and progressively 
rising inflation, as increments of Keynesian reflation appeared to become progressively less 
effective, resulting in a number of policy mistakes that appeared to make the situation worse, 
‘stretching the intellectual coherence of the existing paradigm to the point of breaking’ (Hall, 
1993, p.285). Balance of payments problems, rapid inflation, mounting external debt, poor 
government finances, repeated pressure on Sterling and growing trade union unrest all 
combined. These problems were eventually constructed as a crisis of an ‘overloaded’ and 
oversized state, of the excess power of organised labour, of rising prices and wages, and 
ultimately of an exhausted prevailing macroeconomic model (Hay, 1996.) Monetarism 
provided an intellectually coherent and politically appealing critique of the status quo to 
factions within the Conservative party, as Keynesian policy makers at the Treasury gradually 
lost their authority and credibility on economic policy to an outside market place of economic 
ideas (Hall, 1993, p.286). However, this process itself took several years, as social learning 
proceeded slowly, reflecting the slow burning nature of economic stagnation and persistent 
inflation, the need to interpret these problems and to build political coalitions to support such 
an interpretation. One potential hypothesis that comes out of Hall’s work on macroeconomic 
policy therefore, is that far reaching macroeconomic ideational change is likely to be a 
relatively long term process and is most likely to be catalysed by a long running, slow 
burning crisis of persistent poor macroeconomic performance. Such crises are often complex, 
involving several interrelated features such as rising inflation, economic stagnation and poor 
growth, balance of payments problems and rising budget deficits as in the 1970s case. 
Making the causal connections, working out a narrative and advancing a series of coherent 
prescriptions and a policy framework to address such a complex range of problems can 
therefore take several years. Moreover, such a case for change will require recognisable 
empirical evidence of persistent long running problems over several years if the case for far 
reaching macroeconomic change is to become persuasive to a critical mass of actors.  
 
Policy Sequencing           
Second, Hall’s analysis suggested that sequencing and prior policy experimentation is a 
precondition for far reaching macroeconomic third order change. In the period, from 1973-
1979, successive UK governments experimented  in the form of first and second order 
changes, before new third order objectives were formally embraced by the Thatcher 
government in 1979. Some of these policies, such as the new system for controlling public 
expenditure – ‘cash limits’ and the removal of quantitative controls on lending in the 
financial system, had a distinctly non-Keynesian orientation (Hall, 1993, p.278). Third order 
change involved a specific 1+2 = 3 (eventually) sequence, as a process of ad hoc 
experimentation with policy measures outside of the normal Keynesian frame ensued. This 
sequence is further illustrated in table 1. Policy experimentation of this kind preceded a 
formal third order shift and the embrace of a new set of objectives such as controlling 
inflation and targeting measures of the money supply. For Hall, a paradigm shift had to 
involve a simultaneous shift in all three types of policy. This could only be said to have 
materialised once the Thatcher government’s formally embraced monetarist ideas and 
assumptions in 1979, as controlling inflation and the money supply became the principal 
declared objective at the centre of their new macroeconomic programme and policy 
frameworks. Prior experimentation from outside of the dominant frame increased the 
perception that the old policy frame was redundant and had essentially ceased to function in 
the way intended. Thus prior prolonged policy experimentation increased the strength of 
arguments calling for a new policy frame. 
 
Institutional and Political Context         
Third, Hall drew attention to the political nature of the paradigm shift and how it was 
influenced by the institutional context for the conduct of macroeconomic policy, arguing that 
third order change was ‘more sociological than scientific,’ involving a set of society wide 
judgments more political in tone. In particular, third order macroeconomic change required 
politicians reaching a judgment on which group of experts to regard as ‘authoritative’ (Hall, 
1993, p.280). In Hall’s account third order change in British macroeconomic objectives in the 
1970s was promoted by an alliance of politicians, think tanks and influential journalists such 
as Sir William Rees Mogg and Samuel Brittan, who all cultivated and sought to build public 
support for their arguments, but ultimately depended on the conversion of senior figures in 
the Conservative Party such as Mrs Thatcher (Hall, 1993, pp.286-287). In contrast, the 
development of first and second order changes to particular macroeconomic instruments, and 
their quantitative settings, in the prior 1+2 phase of experimentation were much more 
technical matters. They were, Hall notes, carried out almost exclusively by technocrats and 
civil servants with little input from politicians, or wider political actors (Hall, 1993, p.281). 
This suggests that the detail of macroeconomic policy tends to be less politically contentious 
than a formal announcement of changes in underlying assumptions, overarching objectives 
and a corresponding redesign in policy frameworks.  
      Notably, macroeconomic policy is always a central plank of any aspiring governing 
party’s programme to govern and a key part of its communications with the electorate. 
Approval of third order change in this area, in turn requires widespread political support and 
understanding. In most countries macroeconomic policy resembles what James Thurber has 
referred to as a macropolicy system, - general policy decisions with major political effects 
involving broad public interests, visibility, divisiveness, high media coverage and many 
participants (Thurber, 1996 p.77.) In such policy systems consensus building in favour of far 
reaching change tends to be a slow process due to the sheer number of actors that have to be 
convinced and the fact third order macroeconomic change appears to depend on electoral 
campaigning calculations and cycles.  
Table 1 
Feature Macroeconomic Policy Financial Regulation 
First order Change Quick, technocratic. Slow, political 
Second Order Change Quick, technocratic Slow, political 
Third Order Change Slow, political Quick, technocratic 
Type of Crisis Slow burning – economic 
stagnation 
Dramatic and explosive – 
financial system malfunctions 
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Sequence 1+2=3 3=2+1 
 
      In summary there are three implications of Hall’s analysis for third order macroeconomic 
change. First it is easier for norm entrepreneurs to make causal connections to 
macroeconomic policy and appeal to the intuitions of other actors, when crises take the form 
of a long term, slow burning crisis that is suggestive of long term poor macroeconomic 
performance. Second, prior policy experimentation in the form of 1+2 =3 sequence appears to 
be part of the process of achieving macroeconomic third order change as an old paradigm 
breaks down due to accumulated anomalies (see table 1). Third, third order ideational change 
in the field of macroeconomic policy is likely to require learning and consent from actors 
outside of narrow expert groups, including senior political figures and their constituencies, 
and the process of building the necessary consent and agreement takes time. 
 
The Macroprudential Third Order Ideational Shift of 2009 
It is now widely acknowledged by academics and policy makers that a macroprudential 
ideational shift emerged from the financial crash of 2008 (Borio, 2009, 2011, Baker, 2013a, 
2013b, Persaud, 2010, Haldane, 2009, 2013, Datz, 2013, Goodhart, 2014, Hanson, Kyap and 
Stein, 2011). Since 2009, when endorsement for a macroprudential policy framework made 
its way into various G20 communiqués, new policy committees have been established to 
implement macroprudential policy in the United State (Financial Stability Oversight Council 
FSOC), in the United Kingdom (Financial Policy Committee FPC) and the European Union 
(European Systemic Risk Board ESRB). Furthermore, the Basel III agreement made 
provisions for countercyclical capital buffers as a macroprudential policy instrument. The 
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macroprudential perspective reverses many of the claims of the efficient markets position by 
denying that individually rational self-interested investment strategies are likely to produce 
financial stability and equilibrium, identifying finance’s inherent procyclical tendencies, the 
propensity for herd behaviour amongst investors and the destabilising effects of financial 
complexity (Borio, 2009, Baker, 2013b). The macroprudential ideational shift through its 
assumptions about the behaviour and properties of financial markets, justifies a regulator 
intervening with countercyclical policy measures to restrain and direct market activities on a 
system wide basis. Macroprudential policy involves using prudential measures (a variety of 
capital requirements, both price based and quantity based instruments) for macroeconomic 
ends, or seeking to protect the real economy from financial excess and instability (Haldane, 
2014a, 2013
2
).  
               Viewed in terms of Hall’s criteria, the adoption of macroprudential regulatory 
objectives, assumptions and language can be viewed as an example of third order change. 
According to Hall’s criteria, third order change requires a radical change in the overarching 
terms of policy discourse, in the hierarchy of goals behind policy and in causal assumptions 
or accounts of how the world facing policy makers actually works. The macroprudential shift 
fits all three of these criteria. First, Hall points out that policy makers work within a 
framework of ideas and standards that specify the very nature of the problems they are meant 
to be addressing. Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the very terminology through 
which policy makers communicate about their work (Hall, 1993, p.279.) In the world of 
financial regulation, macroprudential is the new Gestalt. As Claudio Borio of the BIS, has 
astutely observed of his regulatory peers, they are ‘all macroprudentialists now,’ at least in 
terms of broad agreement on the need to develop macroprudential policy instruments and 
regulatory regimes and the importance of combatting destabilising systemic risk (Borio, 
2009). Notably, Macroprudential research has become a growth industry. The BIS, the 
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International Monetary Fund and the Financial Stability Board are regularly producing 
reports and papers on various aspects of macroprudential policy (FSB/ IMF/ BIS, 2011). The 
Bank of England has created a macroprudential strategy division to support the decision 
making of the FPC, while the European Central Bank (ECB) has created the Macroprudential 
Research Network (MaRS) to develop core conceptual frameworks, models and tools in order 
to improve macroprudential supervision and research, including over 180 researchers from 
the ECB and EU national central banks, and academic economists from Europe and the 
United States. In this sense, in Vivien Schmidt’s terms, ‘macroprudential’ can be conceived 
of as a ‘co-ordinative’ discourse that organises experts, through a ‘programme’, that sets the 
underlying organising principles and frames of reference that define the problems to be 
solved by policies, the issues to be considered, the goals to be achieved, the norms, methods 
and instruments to be applied (Schmidt, 2008).     
         Second, there has been a movement from a microprudential approach focused solely on 
evaluating the safety of individual institutions and their VaR models, to viewing risk as a 
systemic and endogenous property requiring system wide regulatory policy instruments and 
interventions to constrain and steer private risk taking and investment strategies as part of 
new macro stabilisation efforts to protect the wider economy from the excesses of the 
financial sector. Moreover, its stronger advocates have suggested the real social purpose of 
macroprudential regulation is to make finance more socially useful, better serving the real 
economy, so that finance becomes the ‘servant rather than the master’ (Haldane, 2012, 2014b 
Turner, 2011, Lothian, 2011). There is therefore scope for representing the emergence of 
macroprudential regulation as a substantial change in the hierarchy of policy goals from 
micro-supervision to macro-level systemic intervention, stabilisation, management and 
direction. Third, macroprudential’s assumptions about endogenous and endemic financial 
instability, draw heavily on the ideas of Hyman Minsky, representing a radically different 
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position from the Eugene Fama inspired pre-crash efficient markets position (Baker, 2013a, 
2013b, Turner, 2011, Barwell, 2013). As Paul Tucker’s statement, discussed earlier in this 
paper indicates, the movement from assuming that financial markets will produce stable 
efficient outcomes, to recognising their propensity to generate instability and negative 
societal wide externalities, changes the foundational assumptions at the core of financial 
regulation, and represents a ‘Gestalt flip’ from the prior efficient markets orthodoxy, a 
process Hall himself associates with third order change (Hall, 1993).  
        The implication of this is that the macroprudential ideational shift has switched the 
cognitive filter employed by policy makers to a quite different setting. Policy makers are now 
using various macroprudential rationales to inform and guide regulatory initiatives and 
practice. The effect of this change is to bring a whole range of practical policy instruments 
within reach, which were previously cursorily dismissed and not even seriously debated or 
considered as a consequence of the dominance of the efficient markets perspective (Baker, 
2013). These include: countercyclical capital requirements; dynamic loan loss provisioning; 
countercyclical liquidity requirements; administrative caps on aggregate lending; reserve 
requirements; limits on leverage in asset purchases; loan to value ratios for mortgages; loan to 
income ratios; minimum margins on secured lending; transaction taxes; constraints on 
currency mismatches; capital controls; and host country regulation (Elliot, 2011). Possibly, 
the most intriguing thing about the macroprudential ideational shift however, is that it can be 
seen to reverse every one of the three characteristics of the third order change in 
macroeconomic policy in the UK, identified by Hall (see table 1). 
 
Time: Dramatic, Explosive Crisis 
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First, in contrast to the long run process of macroeconomic experimentation in Hall’s case, 
the rise of macroprudential thinking from the margins to the centre of the policy agenda was 
rapid and took place in under a year. From the peak of the financial distress in the Autumn of 
2008, the adoption of a macroprudential frame for financial regulation was confirmed in a 
time period of a little over six months. The early centre piece international policy document 
responding to signs of distress in securities and derivatives markets, - a report by the 
Financial Stability Forum in April 2008 (FSF 2008), - re-iterated ‘the familiar trilogy’ 
(Eatwell, 2009), of ‘greater transparency, more disclosure and more effective risk 
management’ by banks and investment funds (FSF, 2008). However, exactly one year later 
the Horsham G20 communiqué was openly advocating counter cyclical capital buffers and 
policies designed to ‘mitigate the procyclicality’ of the financial system, while the London 
G20 summit communiqué  called for the development of macroprudential regulation (G20, 
2009a, 2009b). In a period of little over six months, macroprudential ideas moved from 
relative obscurity in certain enclaves of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), to the 
centre of the policy agenda, dominating and driving the post crisis financial reform debate, in 
the international community of central bankers, (Borio, 2011, Haldane, 2009, Tucker, 2011, 
Bernanke, 2011, Constancio, 2011, FSB/IMF/BIS, 2011, Baker 2013a).   
        The events of 2007-08 were dramatic as asset values collapsed, liquidity dried up, credit 
markets froze, interbank lending markets ground to a halt, several financial institutions 
became insolvent and many others required public financial support of various descriptions to 
continue trading. These dramatic events appeared to provide empirical disconfirmation of the 
efficient markets perspective, but they also created a sense of urgency for policy makers and 
politicians to be seen to be doing something in order to respond to rapidly unfolding events 
by taking affirmative action with a new policy programme, whose constituent concepts 
seemed to predict and provide a framework for explaining and accounting for financial 
19 
 
instability (Persaud, 2010). There was consequently an imperative and pressure to be seen to 
be taking action quickly. Notably, linking the symptoms of financial distress, malfunctioning 
banking systems and frozen inter-bank markets to the destabilising systemic dynamics of 
financial markets and the failure of existing approaches to financial regulation has an 
intuitive appeal. In contrast, linking the crisis to macroeconomic causes by highlighting 
global imbalances, the limits of a narrow focus on inflation, excessive inequality and or a 
broken growth model, are much more complex intellectual arguments that have to specify a 
longer and more elaborate causal chain, and have far less immediate intuitive mass appeal. 
Not only do they take longer to work out, but the act of persuasion that has been agent based 
constructivism’s focus (Widmaier et al, 2007), also becomes a longer and more time 
consuming process.   
       After the extreme events of the Autumn of 2008, existing expert regulatory policy 
networks moved swiftly to seek fill the policy vacuum left by the crash, by drafting a series 
of policy reports that diagnosed the crisis and developed reform proposals (Seabrooke and 
Tsingou, 2014, Baker 2014a). Moreover, by delegating a number of reporting tasks to the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF), later to become the Financial Stability Board (FSB), G20 
politicians essentially turned to the same expert networks that had designed pre-crash 
regulation, which in part was an acknowledgement of the technical and complex nature of the 
questions posed by the malfunctioning of modern, sophisticated financial markets.  A number 
of key experts policy reports followed: the Turner Review (UK); the Geneva Report; the 
European Commission-instigated De Laroisiere report; the United Nations Stiglitz 
Commission report; a G30 report; and reports by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). All 
called for macroprudential regulation and all of them were published in the first half of 2009 
(FSA 2009; Brunnermeir et al. 2009; De Laroisiere 2009; UN 2009; G30 2009; FSF 2009.) In 
this sense, the macroprudential ideational shift resembled what Finnemore and Sikkink have 
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referred to as a ‘norm cascade’ as expert reports repeatedly made the macroprudential case 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). 
         Crucially, macroprudential ideas and arguments already had a key foothold in 
international central bank policy networks. Notably, some staff at the BIS (a source of 
analysis and banking services for central banks) had spent the early 2000s developing 
macroprudential foundational concepts such as procyclicality (Borio, Furfine and Lowe, 
2001, Borio, 2003, Borio and White, 2004, White, 2006, BIS 2006, Clement, 2010). They 
had been aided by eminent academic economists such as Charles Goodhart and Hyun Shin 
who had been undertaking similar work (Goodhart and Segoviano 2004, Morris and Shin, 
2004). Macroprudential ideas had in the words of Claudio Borio of the BIS, been ‘evolving 
quietly in the background, known only amongst a small but growing inner circle of 
cognoscenti’ (Borio, 2011, p.1). Consequently, macroprudential ideas had a prior intellectual 
and institutional presence, particularly at the BIS and amongst a small fraternity of 
economists. Despite being marginal in the pre-crash period therefore, the macroprudential 
perspective did have the strategic advantage of access to the established financial technocratic 
research and report writing machinery that politicians called upon to provide them with 
diagnoses, answers and proposals. Spotting the window of opportunity provided by the 
financial crisis to promote their earlier work in late 2008 and early 2009, BIS officials 
deliberately mobilised a campaign of advocacy, including, at the instigation of the new 
General Manager Jaime Caruana, pushing for macroprudential regulation to be on the G20 
agenda (Confidential interview with BIS official, 7 February 2014).
At the same time, the Bank of England had an in-house financial stability team that had 
worked on macroprudential issues since 2004, but chose to avoid publicly discussing these 
matters, because of the prevailing climate of opinion, and a recognition there was little point 
in putting this analysis in play because there would not be much of an audience for it both 
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within the Bank, but also outside, particularly in the United States. However, as explained by 
one Bank of England official, “this meant when the balloon went up, we already had the ideas 
in our knap sack. We had already discovered religion” (Confidential interview Bank of England 
Official, 10 December 2013.) Consequently, the macroprudential perspective had an advantage 
in terms of institutional access and a body of prior work that outlined the inadequacies of the 
prior efficient markets orthodoxy. Its emphasis on the systemic, procyclical and unstable 
dynamics of financial markets, provided a ready made conceptual apparatus for explaining 
the events of Autumn 2008. This effectively made the macroprudential perspective an off the 
shelf set of proposals that could be presented to politicians and senior policy makers 
(Confidential interview BIS official, 7 February 2014). These factors of prior intellectual and 
institutional presence help to explain the relatively rapid nature of the macroprudential 
ideational shift.    
Policy Sequencing  
Second, the sequencing at work in the case of the macroprudential ideational shift was 
exactly the reverse of that evident in the case of UK macroeconomic policy in the 1970s. 
There was no process of sustained prior policy experimentation with first and second order 
policy change from outside of the efficient markets perspective, with the exception of the odd 
isolated case
3
. Rather than a sequence of 1+2=3, the macroprudential shift, has involved a 
move straight to 3, prior to first and second order policy experimentation. The significance of 
this is that macroprudential policy is currently in a highly experimental phase of
first and second order policy development, as countercyclical capital buffers and loan to 
value ratios and other policy instruments are developed and tested. As officials at the Bank of 
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England note, “the state of macroprudential policy resembles the state of monetary policy just 
after the second world war, with patchy data, incomplete theory and negligible experience, 
meaning that MPR will be conducted by trial and error” (Aikman, Haldane, and Nelson, 
2011). This makes the macroprudential ideational shift a highly contingent one, but also an 
interesting test case for assessing whether a 3=2+1 sequence can be sustained without prior 
first and second order policy experimentation, or whether successful paradigm shifts always 
have to follow the 1+2=3 sequence first identified by Hall (Baker, 2013a)..  
      For BIS officials involved in pioneering the conceptual frame of macroprudential 
regulation, a conceptual framework was first required to provide guidance for how policy 
instruments could be used (Correspondence with official, 12/02/12.) One reason for this 
reversed sequencing is that macroeconomic policy often requires forms of policy 
experimentation. The slow burning and non-dramatic nature of macroeconomic crises means 
that as in Hall’s case, existing policy frameworks often gradually accumulate anomalies and 
cease to function as intended, necessitating, but also allowing the time and space for 
incremental and ad hoc experimentation. In contrast, financial regulation is directly 
concerned with financial markets, which can be volatile and conditions can change suddenly. 
This means conceptual understandings of their functioning can break down much more 
quickly and also have to be revised much more hastily. In the pre-crash period, because 
regulators in leading financial centres like the US and UK were very content with the 
prevailing efficient markets light tough approach to financial regulation, it meant that 
advocates of an alternative view such as staff at the BIS, who wield influence through the 
provision of analysis, had to first develop conceptual work, outlining and further developing 
concepts such as procyclicality, as a rationale for the use of countercyclical policy 
instruments, if they were to ever stand a chance of persuading their client states and central 
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banks to take macroprudential regulation seriously (Correspondence with the author, 
12/02/02.).  
 
Institutional and Political Context         
Third, macroprudential ideational change was promoted by insider technocrats largely 
operating in established expert regulatory networks, which in the world of central banking 
and financial regulation have many of the features of transnational epistemic clan structures. 
Central banking is increasingly comprised of ‘knowledge communities’ constructed around 
inter-paradigmatic discussions about theory, methods, and data, as central banks’ 
organizational, territorial, and cultural boundaries blur with co-equal central bankers working 
closely together from project to project (Marcussen 2006, p. 10).  G20 politicians did endorse 
the ideational shift, but they were not instrumental instigating it, as they were in the 
macroeconomic case of the 1970s. Third order macroprudential change was not a societal 
wide process. In Thurber’s terms financial regulatory networks generally have the 
characteristics of policy subsystems, with low visibility, narrow scope for conflict, relatively 
low levels of conflict and a relatively small number of elite participants (Thurber, 1996, 
p.78). The macroprudential ideational shift, as we have established did resemble a rapid shift 
in beliefs and values, - what Baumgartner and Jones have termed ‘a dramatic change in 
policy image.’ However, unlike their case of nuclear policy this was not the result of a 
simultaneous shift in policy venue (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991.) Instead, in the 
macroprudential case, the policy venue for promoting rapid change in the dominant financial 
regulatory policy image remained more or less constant, -  a specialist series of international 
expert networks. These venues and established elites remained in the driving seat in 
forwarding regulatory proposals, because it was to these expert venues, politicians turned for 
guidance.  There was however a significant reconfiguration in who was prominent in these 
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networks, in the plausibility of their case and their persuasive capacity. The pattern with the 
macroprudential ideational shift was that a number of officials who had either been openly 
publicly critical of the prior orthodoxy, such as Borio and his BIS collegues, or had been 
privately critical but had felt unable to speak out in the prevailing climate, such as the Bank 
of England’s financial stability team, became more prominent and vocal and found that the 
climate of opinion amongst politicians, the public at large and senior central bank policy 
makers within their own networks were much more receptive to their arguments (Baker, 
2013a). This process was accompanied by some evidence of reflexive learning by key pivotal 
individuals in the central banking community, as the weight of expert contributions amassed 
in the immediate post-crash period of 2009. One of the consequences of this willingness to 
engage in reflective learning was to keep central banks as key interlocutors in the field of 
financial governance and even expand their authority at the expense of microprudential 
supervisors, who are often lawyers and accountants, rather than macroeconomists 
(confidential interview BIS official, 7 February 2014), in a classic case of professional 
consolidation (Baker, 2014b). One notable example, was Bank of England governor Mervyn 
King, who had limited interest in financial regulation and had remained almost exclusively 
focused on monetary policy in the pre-crash period (Giles, 2012), but became converted to 
the macroprudential cause after the dramatic events of 2008, as a consequence of his 
participation in international networks such as the FSB and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, as well as the work of the Bank’s own financial stability team (Confidential 
interview Bank of England official, 27
th
 March, 2014).  As such this process resembled an 
‘insiders’ coup d’etat,4’ as macroprudential change agents acted as ‘insider subversives’ in 
Mahoney and Thelen’s terminology. Such change agents work against an existing system 
from within it (termites in the basement), appearing supportive of existing arrangements but 
promoting new rules and ways of thinking on the edge of old ones (Mahoney and Thelen, 
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2010, p.26). Such change agents also bide their time, disguising the true extent of their 
preferences, waiting for the moment at which they can actively advance their true 
preferences, playing a long game, as in the case of the Bank of England’s financial stability 
team, but mobilising rapidly when an opportunity arises (Confidential interview Bank of 
England Official, 10 December, 2013.) Claudio Borio captured the fast moving nature of the 
macroprudential ideational shift, and how the perspective went from being relatively 
unpopular to being the primary policy frame due to the dramatic events of 2008. “A decade 
ago the term macroprudential was barely used and there was little appetite amongst policy 
makers and regulators to even engage with the concept, let alone strengthen macroprudential 
regulation….This swell of support [for macroprudential regulation] could not have been 
anticipated even as recently as a couple of years ago. The current financial crisis has been 
instrumental in underpinning it” (Borio, 2009, p.2 and p.32).  
       Those such as Borio,  who had publicly made arguments critical of the pre-crash 
orthodoxy, also experienced a rise in their levels of professional esteem, due to their prior 
performance in making some accurate calls and appearing prescient (Baker, 2013a, Baker 
2014b). Famously, Borio and his BIS colleague Bill White had sought to move the 
international consensus in a macroprudential direction, when they presented a paper at the 
Jackson Hole Conference of the Kansas City Federal Reserve in 2003, but received a cold 
reaction from the senior central bankers present including Alan Greenspan (Balzil and 
Schiessl, 2009).  White, even earned the ironic moniker ‘Merry Sunshine’ at the Fed, in 
response to his repeated warnings about financial instability, but by 2009 had become one of 
the most in demand speakers in the world of central banking (Balzil and Schiessl, 2009).   
         The characteristics of the financial regulatory policy subsystem and the technical arcane 
nature of the subject matter, essentially allowed a coalition of public officials from central 
banks, related organizations and academic economists to change the dominant policy frame, 
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relatively quickly and with little formal opposition. Macroprudential change agents were less 
dependent on building consensus, support and levels of understanding amongst wider societal 
and political actors, which macroeconomic policy’s much higher political profile requires, 
although ultimately the technocratic nature of the macroprudential project may present long 
term legitimacy problems (Baker and Widamier, 2014).  Opposition to third order 
macroprudential regulatory philosophy has been relatively mute. For example, one might 
expect most opposition to come from the private sector and from large banks. Yet, the 
Institute for International Finance (IIF), part lobby group and part think tank for large North 
American and European Banks, has generally been supportive of a macroprudential approach 
to financial regulation, at least in broad conceptual terms (IIF, 2011). Instead of contesting 
the broad philosophy behind macroprudential, the IIF has focused its attention on slowing 
and diluting first and second order policy change. The IIF has suggested that ‘the science’ in 
this area is at an early stage, while using capital as an instrument of macrostabilization was 
‘unprecedented and untested’, requiring authorities to ‘exercise great caution ’ (IIF, 2011, 
p.22). In national settings such as the UK, political parties and politicians, have not contested 
the need for macroprudential regulation, or its rationale, but bodies such as the Treasury 
Select Committee have taken a great interest in the operation of the new FPC and have sought 
to create mechanisms to call FPC policy makers to account, carving out an oversight role for 
themselves in the process. Ultimately, because first order policy settings and second policy 
instruments have implications for the day to day investment strategies and market operations 
of a variety of market actors, and the turf and standing of wider institutional and legislative 
actors, political contestation has been far more focused on appropriate first order policy 
settings and second order institutional policy arrangements, than on third order change. The 
result is a far more contested, contingent and even controversial sphere of first and second 
order macroprudential policy development, which of course may dilute macroprudential 
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policy content, in substantive terms and stymie any potential paradigm shift (Baker, 2013b). 
Third order change without substantive first and second order policy movement would 
amount to little. Once again this is the reverse of the pattern in macroeconomic policy and 
both the differing nature of the crises and the different institutional and political 
characteristics of financial regulatory and macroeconomic policy systems as outlined here 
combine to provide reasons for that. 
        
 
Macroeconomic Policy and the Financial Crash of 2008 
In the area of macroeconomic policy, foundational assumptions have proved far more 
resilient to change, since the financial crash of 2008, than in the case of financial regulation, 
as Paul Tucker’s statement indicated. The general pattern identified in this article, is of a far 
slower pace of learning in macroeconomic policy, not only due to the slow burning nature of 
macroeconomic problems, which often have complicated causal chains, but also because of 
the number of actors that have to consent to far reaching third order change in a macro policy 
system. There is certainly considerable evidence that macroeconomic learning has been a 
much slower and more pragmatic process. For example, as Hodson and Mabbett note, first 
order changes to the setting of new policy instruments and second order changes in the 
introduction of new macroeconomic policy instruments, were not accompanied by third 
change in the form of a fundamentally new understanding of how the economy works 
(Hodson and Mabbett, 2009). In the UK case fiscal policy discretionary measures following 
the crash amounted to only around 1.4 per cent of GDP, of the UK’s ballooning deficit 
(OECD, 2009.) Reports of the Labour Party’s reconversion to Keynesian demand 
management were therefore grossly exaggerated (Hodson and Mabbett, 2009, p.1058).  
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      In monetary policy, the turn to quantitative easing continues to reflect the limitations of 
conventional monetary policies under current circumstances, but it has not as yet entailed a 
jettisoning of the existing monetary policy framework (Hodson and Mabbett, 2009, p.1057). 
More recently debate has begun about the use of nominal income or GDP targets as a guide 
for monetary policy (Bean, 2013). At the same time IMF research increasingly raises 
questions about the practical use of inflation targeting, suggesting that targets of 2 per cent or 
below may have a detrimental distributional impact on those in the bottom part of the income 
stream, resulting in poor macroeconomic performance (IMF, 2014, Moghadam, Teja and 
Berkman, 2014, Kirshner, 2001). However, these questions are only being raised some five 
years after the financial crash of 2008, during which time the success and usefulness of the 
existing inflation targeting monetary policy regime has begun to be widely questioned, 
largely because inflation targeting has been redundant as a guide for policy for the last five 
years. In this respect, monetary policy frameworks are beginning to display the accumulated 
anomalies that Hall claims beset the Keynesian paradigm in the 1970s, even if there are still 
as yet no concrete plans to replace inflation targeting.  
       Fiscal policy too, is gradually becoming a more complex ideationally contested area. In 
the UK, after being critical of the coalition government’s attempted deficit reduction strategy, 
based on a discourse of public spending ‘crowding out’ private investment, the current 
Labour opposition is now pledging to keep to the coalition’s spending plans. Despite this 
move, the IMF has encouraged the UK government to slow down fiscal consolidation given 
low growth and prolonged stagnation in the 2008-13 period, pointing out that the UK has 
considerable fiscal policy space due to the length of debt maturities (Clift and Tomlinson, 
2012). In this sense, post crash, the IMF has adopted a much more pragmatic line on fiscal 
policy emphasising, context-dependent, contingent, and inherently transient historical 
constructs, rather than doctrinaire notions of fiscal consolidation (Clift and Tomlinson, 2012, 
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p.16.) Greater emphasis has been placed by Fund analysis on fiscal policy as an important 
potential ‘counter cyclical’ tool (Blanchard et al, 2010). The Fund has also argued that, ‘those 
with room for fiscal policy manoeuvring, in terms of their fiscal accounts and credibility with 
markets, can reconsider the pace of consolidation’ (IMF 2012, p.21). Nevertheless, despite 
the emergence of such alternative analyses and growing ideational contestation in the area of 
fiscal policy, the dominant pattern has been the emergence of a new era of austerity and a 
pattern of ideational stickiness drawing on notions of expansionary fiscal consolidations and 
Ricardian equivalence (Blyth, 2013, Farrell and Quiggins, 2012, Dellepiane‐Avellaneda, 
2014).  
         Linking the explosive banking and financial crash of 2008, to macroeconomic policy 
and problems is a less straight forward intellectual case to make, than pointing to a flawed 
intellectual frame for financial regulation and therefore is likely to require analysis and 
reflection on post-crash macroeconomic performance over a period of time, as long term 
evidence and data emerges. Moreover, as we saw at the beginning of the article, key expert 
authorities, such as central banks, have not had the same institutional incentives to question 
dominant macroeconomic practice, as they have in financial regulation.  Based on the 
experience of the 1970s and the available evidence following the financial crash of 2008, it 
would seem that the three conditions identified by Hall in the 1970s case, were not 
immediately present following the financial crash of 2008. First there was a dramatic 
malfunction of the banking and financial system, rather than a long gestation period of 
macroeconomic under performance and stagnation, although this of course may yet emerge 
through persistent poor growth for major economies and sustained deflation in the Eurozone
5
.  
Other scholars have suggested that sustained deflation in particular can create conditions ripe 
for elite persuasion strategies for significant macroeconomic policy change, again suggesting 
that the variety of crisis matter for the variety of ideational change we can expect to witness 
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in policy making (Blyth, 2007). Second, there was little evidence of a 1+2 sequence of 
anomaly accumulation and subsequent prolonged prior macroeconomic experimentation with 
first and second order policy decisions outside of the existing macroeconomic paradigm in 
the run up to 2008. More recently, it is conceivable that we have now entered a phase of 
‘technocratic inter-paradigm borrowing’, as the old framework certainly in monetary policy 
has gradually become  redundant and difficult to operate, and the evidence cited above 
suggests as much (Hay, 2011). Third, largely because of the absence of the two prior 
conditions there was no broad consensus on the failure of previous macroeconomic policy 
frameworks and only initial stirrings of political dissatisfaction with prior macroeconomic 
approaches. There was certainly no politically feasible, or immediately appealing and 
intellectual coherent alternative, with the exception of some short-term limited emergency 
Keynesianism. Previous instances of significant macroeconomic ideational change, suggest 
macroeconomic discontent has to brew over time as problems and anomalies accumulate, 
alternative narratives and approaches are built, and processes of persuasion are embarked 
upon that results in some sort of politically viable consensus amongst the multiple actors that 
participate in the macro policy system of macroeconomic policy debate.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that the interpretations of crisis that become dominant will partially be 
determined by the symptoms a particular crisis displays, as well as the institutional features 
of the policy system that have responsibility for particular areas of policy. As Reinhart and 
Rogoff have identified, financial crises take many different forms. They identify seven types 
of crises covering: inflation crises; currency crashes; currency debasement; asset price 
bubbles bursting; banking crises; external debt crises; and domestic debt crises (Reinhart and 
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Rogoff, 2009). However, their classificatory schema is both mechanical and arbitrary, as they 
either rely on narrow quantitative measures, or equally narrowly defined events, to form their 
definitions. This not only obscures potential causal chains, and how crises can move around 
and flow into one another, but it also pays little attention to how crises come to be understood 
cognitively, and responded to, by a critical mass of societal and political actors, which in turn 
gives inter-subjective meaning to a crisis (Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007). A true 
political economy of financial crises therefore needs to examine how ideas are used by policy 
actors to interpret crises, but also how ideas in different policy domains change and respond 
to different forms of crisis in different ways. A more straight forward, simple distinction in 
terms of varieties of crisis, has been adopted here. A distinction has been drawn between 
explosive crises emanating from malfunctioning banking systems and private mal-
investment, and slow burning crises of stagnation, declining living standards, falling wages 
and prices, or rising wages and prices, which involve a failure of government macroeconomic 
policies to meet stated targets, or objectives. These two forms of crisis can also obviously be 
connected and flow into one another, but they are unlikely to be interpreted in the same way, 
or to lead to the same patterns of ideational and institutional change.   
          In this respect, the existing literature has paid insufficient enough attention to how 
ideas interact with and respond to the material symptoms of crises, and how different policy 
sub systems can react and behave in different ways to different forms of crises. I have argued 
that the capacity for agents to affect change during periods of crisis is constrained by the type 
of crisis and its symptoms, as well as the institutional and political context that prevails in 
particular policy areas. The evidence presented here shows how different policy areas are 
subject to different political dynamics, different sequences and time frames, and become 
politically contentious in different ways. The paper has sought to demonstrate three specific 
differences between macroeconomic policy and financial regulation, drawing on Peter Hall’s 
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work, as illustrated in table 1. The paper has hypothesised that fundamental macroeconomic 
change requires the presence of three conditions: persistent macroeconomic failure and 
stagnation over a considerable 5-10 year period; prior policy experimentation from outside of 
the existing paradigm that reveals the inadequacies and anomalies of the existing policy 
framework; and growing political dissatisfaction with the existing paradigm, combined with 
the construction of an enabling coalition pushing a genuinely intellectually coherent and 
politically appealing  alternative, which in the field of macroeconomic policy takes time to 
assemble due to the presence of numerous potential veto players. In contrast financial 
regulation, as a policy subsystem behaves rather differently. Technical experts were able to 
act opportunistically and affect third order policy change and radically change the dominant 
policy frame and the assumptions on which it was based in a short period of time, with little 
signs of significant opposition. However, industry opposition and political contestation 
appears to be far more fierce in financial regulation over detail, than it is over broad 
parameters. Not only has third order change been quicker in the field of financial regulation, 
the sequencing that applies in macroeconomic policy has been reversed, while fights over the 
detail of policy appear far more contentious and contested than broad objectives. The 
explanation forwarded for this has emphasised that macroeconomic policy is more likely to 
respond to a slow burning crisis than dramatic banking crises, because this allows for 
complex causal chains to be interpreted and for political support for those interpretations to 
be built in diffuse macro policy systems. Time also allows for the policy experimentation to 
take place which further undermines an existing paradigm. In contrast, financial regulation 
has a policy system that can respond in a rapid and intellectually radically fashion to dramatic 
and explosive banking crises, but is then constrained by politically contested battles over 
points of detail.  
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 Amongst BIS officials who pushed hard for macroprudential philosophies a suspicion lingers that the central 
banking community accepted these idea, when previously they had been resistant, because of a calculation that 
macroprudential potentially takes  some of the pressure and strain off monetary policy, and therefore prevents a 
serious or fundamental overhaul of monetary policy frameworks.  
2
 See endnote 1. 
3
 What is marked about the pre crisis period is how few cases of operational macroprudential policy such as the 
system of counter cyclical capital buffers or ‘dynamic provisioning’ in Spain, and India there were. These cases 
were outliers and subsequently held up as functioning examples of macroprudential policy. The predominant 
attitude towards macroprudential policy amongst advanced country regulators was one of scepticism. 
4
 I am grateful to Mark Blyth for suggesting this insightful phrase.  
5
 Note the scholarship of Blyth (2002) and Helleiner (2010) on the response to the Wall Street Crash and the 
Great Depression emphasises that the macroeconomic settlement of embedded liberalism and of the Bretton 
Woods agreement took over fifteen years to construct, following the initial point of financial distress in 1929. 
